He’s curved and white-haired, and he talks a little funny. But Kirk Douglas, at 93, stole the show at the Britannia Awards on Thursday night. It was the first black tie event of the awards season and hopefully not the last Hollywood will see of the star of “Spartacus.”

Recognized for his contribution to world cinema, Douglas was charming and delighted and delightful. Despite the vestiges of a stroke on his ability to speak, he gamely quipped to Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who introduced him, that he was glad “Maria let you out of the house.”

The actor was the first of the evening to win an award, whose other honorees were filmmaker Danny Boyle, actress Emily Blunt, Colin Firth for his humanitarian work and the legendary Robert De Niro.

As is the way of Hollywood, all were quite deserving, but they also had movies to promote – “Young Victoria” for Blunt, “A Single Man” for Firth -- and nominations for which to be positioned this season.

And then there was the elfin Douglas, who literally danced his way up to the podium to accept his award, and who three times brought the glittering crowd to its feet with his wit and verve.

The final ovation came when Douglas – who wished aloud that his friend Burt Lancaster were still around – set out to sing “London Town,” which he did, and many in the room sang along with him.

When he finished, he’d won everyone over, and left the crowd the memorable image of a unique, enduring movie star.

If content isn’t king, then we’re all in trouble.

But that’s one of several conventional wisdoms that Columbia Business School economists Bruce Greenwald and Jonathan Knee, along with media consultant Ava Seave, seek to puncture in their new book, “The Curse of the Mogul: What’s Wrong With the World’s Leading Media Companies.” (see part I)

“Making movies, producing music and publishing books have been terrible businesses for a very long time,” they say. And the Internet is making it worse.

Here’s their argument: The movie, television and music businesses have become hit-driven – the blockbuster and franchise mentality has dominated since the 1980s. Media companies need the moguls' supposed skills in producing blockbusters to be successful.

But, they argue, “there is simply no efficient way to monetize this skill for the benefit of shareholders rather than the producers themselves.”

In other words, loads of money is being made off of “Pirates of the Caribbean” and the “Terminator” series. But, the authors argue, none of it is going to shareholders – instead it’s going to the producers and the overpaid executives.

OK. But by that logic, content can still be king – which is a concept that suggests that it’s the quality of the movie or song or book that creates the value, rather than the delivery system, or the fancy packaging – or the mogul, for that matter.

And that would simply mean shareholders who want to be in high yield, high-dividend companies should invest in something else. (And when they find out what that something else is, please let me know.)

This approach also seriously oversimplifies the landscape of entertainment companies. The studios and TV networks are now small divisions of huge, diversified conglomerates like Sony, General Electric (not for long, but you get the idea), and Time Warner, whose shareholder value is still being hurt  far worse by the disastrous merger with AOL , rather than by the performance of “Batman” at Warner Brothers.

Here’s the reality on the ground: studios have been managing the risk of high costs for at least the last five years by making outside financiers fund their ever-more-expensive movie productions.

They have also dramatically cut costs in the past two years – to the great pain of independent producers and the dismay of talent agents everywhere – by ending overhead deals, reducing the number of movies they’re making and cutting deep into the $20 million fees once paid to A-list talent, but almost never paid anymore.

One absolutely valid point, however, is that – sorry, guys – you moguls are dramatically overpaid.

As we explored in one of our first Wrap investigations, the executives at the top of media companies make insane salaries when compared to those of, say, new media companies that have explosive growth and created explosive shareholder value. (Those guys get paid in shares, d’uh.)

That’s a great big elephant in the room that you can expect every mogul to ignore.

If Tom Cruise can’t make $20 million per film anymore, why in the world can Les Moonves still make $20 million a year?

Meanwhile, the authors make a compelling case that the media industry fails to distinguish good growth from bad growth. Moguls feed their addiction to growth via ill-advised acquisitions.

They give the example of Comcast overpaying for AT&T Broadband. Of Rupert Murdoch overpaying for IGN Entertainment, which quickly followed the acquistion of MySpace in 2005 but for even more money -- $650 million.

They examine the stock performance of media companies before and after acquistions, and shows “the faster the revenue grew, the worse the stock performed.”

 “Media moguls seem congenitally uable to give the cash thrown off by these enterprises back to shareholders.”

So, OK, perhaps Hollywood is profligate. Perhaps media moguls do like to lay out cash for shiny, expensive objects.

But then the authors go too far and ask: Does Hollywood need movie lots?

“Sure the tours are cool … but does anyone really believe that Columbia, Paramount, Universal and 20th Century Fox all require major studio lots in greater Los Angeles in order to operate effectively?”

Wouldn’t it make more sense, the authors heretically suggest, to contribute some portion of the studio lots “to a joint operating company whose sole purpose would be to run them at optimal capacity for the shareholders ad sell the excess for redevelopment?”

And does anyone think this is likely to happen? Ever?

Anyone?

In their new book “The Curse of the Mogul,” a trio of academics take aim at the business of Hollywood and big media. Their conclusion: It’s the moguls’ fault. It’s their fault that media companies are inefficient, that executives are overpaid, that they fail to increase shareholder value -- and that their acquisitions are ego-boosting destroyers of value that achieve no real synergies. “The shocking, evident, persistent and oddly ignored fact is that the financial returns of media companies significantly and relentlessly falls below those of the stock market as a whole,” the authors write in their “the emperor has no clothes”-toned introduction. (They are Columbia Business School professors Jonathan Knee and Bruce Greenwald, and media consultant Ava Seave.) “For all the excitement, glamour, drama and publicity releases they produce, why can’t these companies come close to delivering the kind of returns available from closing your eyes and throwing

 a dart?” Ouch. The evidence they offer is further wince-inducing:   For most every recent 10-year period – and they settled on 1995-2005 as their sample -- media conglomerates achieved less than one third of the returns available from the S&P, “and none of them came closer than 400 basis points (4%) of this benchmark.” Between 1995 and 2005, the shareholder returns were, for: News Corp 5%; Viacom 3%; Disney 2.6%; Time Warner -.7%. That makes an average of 2.5% -- compared to a 9% rise in value for the S&P. This is the kind of hard evidence that Hollywood doesn’t like to look at. And on the face of it, it does seem strange. We in the media have long written about the fact that media and entertainment companies are now run by the dictates of Wall Street, rather than the demands of either the consumer market, or the long-term visions of the legendary moguls of yore, who used to run major studios like MGM and Columbia decades ago. (And by the way, they ran those companies as supremely profitable enterprises. That’s because they and their families owned them.) So it is a rare and and welcome analysis that brings these numbers out into daylight, measuring media companies by the drab metrics of shareholder value and not, say, by the number of weekend wins at the box office or the number of photo ops with Johnny Depp.  (The authors have some fun with tweaking perception of value versus shareholder value; see the chart above.) They do acknowledge that media companies hit the S&P level from 1990-2000, during the Internet bubble, “but for every other 10-year period, the conglomerates meaningfully underperformed.” Their critique is especially worth considering as media companies face a brutal and fast-changing landscape, with another major acquisition, Comcast and NBC-Uni, on the horizon. So does this mean that shareholders ought to divest themselves of media companies ASAP, before Comcast sins again? Well, hold on a minute there. Media companies are actually not like all other companies. That may be heresy for Columbia Business School professors, but it is undeniably true. There is an unquantifiable, but absolutely valid, value that media companies represent, and that makes them so desirable: influence. Influence over public taste, over consumer trends. Engagement and influence over popular culture. Influence over the flow of information, access to newsmakers. It’s not just about being able to attend the Oscars, though that’s certainly an enduring draw. The authors make the mistake of looking at the public popularity of media companies, and concluding that fear is the propellor behind that. They write of the “peculiarly American paranoia about the media industry’s ability and inclination to mold the national psyche.” It’s not paranoia. It’s a reality. That is largely the reason why media companies remain as sexy and relevant as they are – even in the miserable down market they now face. The authors' argument is poorly supported as it pertains to the moguls themselves.

Strangely, they use former Vivendi CEO Jean-Marie Messier – who owned a U.S. entertainment company , NBC-Universial, for all of three years – as their textbook  case of a bad mogul. And they use Lew Wasserman, arguably the most iconic Hollywood mogul in the latter part of the 20th century – as the example of an atypically good mogul. They cite Wasserman as the exception to their generalization of Hollywood profligates – someone who worked his business with great efficiency, tight financial controls and a keen eye to the bottom line. That undermines the title of the book, in my view. If Wasserman is the exception, and Messier the interloper is the rule – then they have the wrong definition of a mogul. Tomorrow: Why Content Isn’t King, and How Hollywood Missed the Memo on Acquisitions

IATSE, one of Hollywood's largest unions, has called off the dogs in its dispute with the American Film Institute and an agreement has been struck, the union said on Wednesday.

The guild had called for a boycott of AFI events because, it said, the institute was conducting anti-organizing activities at its Silver Spring, Maryland facility. 

"As a result of talks between the IATSE and executives at the American Film Institute, the AFI management at its Silver Theater and Cultural Center in Silver Spring, Maryland negotiated an agreement with the union to represent the theater’s front of house employees," the union announce. 

The workers at the venue had signed cards authorizing the union to bargain on their behalf.   IATSE President Matthew Loeb threatened action at the site of the AFI Fest in Los Angeles if the matter remained unresolved.    An agreement providing significant wage, benefit and condition improvements was reached on Nov. 4, 2009.      The International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied Crafts of the United States, Its Territories and Canada, AFL-CIO, CLC  (IATSE) is one of the largest entertainment labor unions in the world and represents over 110,000 technicians, artisans and craftspeople employed in stagecraft, motion picture and television production, the trade show industry, and affiliated crafts throughout the United States, Its Territories and Canada.

Disney's progress toward building a theme park in Shanghai took a step forward with the Chinese government's approval of the company's application to build, the company announced on Tuesday.

The Project Application Report was for a Disney theme park in the Pudong district of Shanghai, and was approved by relevant authorities of the central government of China.

“China is one of the most dynamic, exciting and important countries in the world, and this approval marks a very significant milestone for The Walt Disney Company in mainland China,” said Robert Iger, president and CEO of The Walt Disney Company.   The application approval will enable Disney and its Shanghai partners to move forward toward a final agreement to build and operate the park and begin preliminary development work. The New York Times reported that the park will cost $3.5 billion, and is scheduled to be completed in five or six years.   Upon completion of the final agreement, the project’s initial phase would include a 1,000-acre, Magic Kingdom-style theme park with characteristics tailored to the Shanghai region and other amenities consistent with Disney’s destination resorts worldwide.  

Disney parks currently include: Disneyland Resort, Anaheim, Calif.; Walt Disney World Resort, Lake Buena Vista, Fla.; Tokyo Disney Resort, Urayasu, Chiba, Japan; Disneyland Paris, Marne-la-Vallée, France; and Hong Kong Disneyland Resort, located on Lantau Island.

Now that Disney has completely gutted Miramax, the once-dominant name in the independent film business – does the studio really still need the name?

Everything else is gone: the New York office, the slate of films which has dwindled to a handful of forgettable titles. Even Daniel Battsek is history.

Why hang on to a name that means little?

It’s been four years since indie film bad boys Harvey and Bob Weinstein got divorced from The Walt Disney Company, leaving with no library, little cash – and without the name of the company that was named after their parents, Miriam and Max.

It was a final act of spite by an embittered then-CEO, Michael Eisner. At the time, Eisner’s deputy Robert Iger encouraged his boss to let the Weinstein brothers take the name, at least.

Eisner, in an ungenerous mood, refused. He let them take "Dimension" instead.

Instead, the Weinsteins started their own independent film label, waiting until the very last minute to come up with a name – for a long time everyone thought it was going to be “Newco.” They ended up with the equally unsatisfying "Weinstein Company."

This is a subject of discussion down in Tribeca these days since Disney has cut the division's workforce by 70 percent down to 20 people earlier this month, and plans to shutter Miramax's New York headquarters by the end of the year. Miramax plans on releasing only three titles per year going forward.

Individuals close to the Weinsteins confirm that Harvey and his brother would like to ask Iger if he’d consider giving up the name, since the major studio seems to care so little about it.

The Weinsteins still consider the decision a slight, and are particularly sensitive since their mother is alive and non-appreciative of Disney’s position.They founded the company in 1979, and sold it to Disney in 1993.

If Disney allowed the brothers to buy the name, one Weinstein executive said on condition of anonymity, they would change the name of TWC back to Miramax.

“We’d even be happy to manage the library,” said the executive.

So – what’s up Mickey Mouse? Ready to bury the hatchet? Hey, even Paramount let DreamWorks take the name when they left.

A Disney spokeswoman said she was not aware of any request.

See also:

Daniel Battsek Exits as Miramax President

Miramax Shrinks at Disney

Rich Ross Tapped to Run Disney Studios

More Indie Shrinkage: The Film Dept. Teams With Weinstein

Labor troubles ahead: IATSE President Matthew D. Loeb asked for a boycott of all activities under the auspices of the American Film Institute because of AFI's attempts to discourage organizing of a union at the AFI Silver Theatre and Cultural Center in Silver Spring, Maryland, the union said on Saturday.  

In his letter released Saturday, Loeb wrote:

"I am writing to advise you of a situation that has arisen between the IATSE and the American Film Institute relative to the ushers and ticket takers. This group of important employees at the AFI’s facility in Silver Spring, Maryland, has sought to be represented by the IATSE. Unfortunately, the AFI has engaged in activities meant to disparage the union, discourage support for representation and otherwise exploit the sensitive position of employees exercising their right for representation by creating undue fear and uncertainty about their futures. I have attached two pieces of correspondence that leave little to the imagination with respect to the AFI’s clear and outrageous anti-union activities.   "The IATSE and many of its members have supported the AFI over the years. We occupy an essential and unique position in the motion picture industry and, as such, I am shocked by the position taken by the AFI. I have personally attempted to adjust the matter with AFI’s Director Ray Berry to no avail.   "I ask that you support the IATSE in its efforts to assist these individuals in their right to organize by boycotting any AFI-sponsored events and to make known publicly that financial support of AFI should be withheld until this matter is resolved.   Thank you, in advance, for your part in supporting what is simply fair and just."    The International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, Moving Picture Technicians, Artists and Allied Crafts of the United States, Its Territories and Canada, AFL-CIO, CLC  (IATSE) is one of the largest entertainment labor unions in the world and represents more than 110,000 technicians, artisans and craftspeople employed in stagecraft, motion picture and television production, the trade show industry and affiliated crafts throughout the United States, Its territories and Canada.

 

 

 

 

Consolidation is the name of the game everywhere in the movie business these days.

Mark Gill's independent film company, The Film Department, has decided to hand international sales duties to The Weinstein Company after Steve Bickel, who was president of international, exited the company this week, the company confirmed.

The relationships between the parties are old and storied.

Gill, of course, spent eight years of his career with the Weinstein brothers running marketing and eventually its West Coast branch, although it was a tortured relationship that ended abruptly and with bitter feelings in 2002.

Apparently that coda has been put behind both parties. Now Weinstein's David Glasser will take charge of international. Glasser once ran international at Yari Film Group, where he worked with Gill's partner, Neil Sacker.

Gill founded The Film Department with Sacker in 2007, after having founded and run Warner Independent Pictures, which was shut down by Warner Brothers as an indie arm that didn't make the kind of profits that suited the major studio.

The Film Department also announced that Kristen Figeroid, vice president of international, and Inc Pagluica of international business affairs would remain in their current positions.